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Introduction
There is a small palm tree in a garden surrounded by walls near the airport
in Baghdad. An elderly bearded man who has turned to writing poetry and
reading the words of God in recent weeks goes out to the garden for an hour
and a half in the morning and an hour and a half in the afternoon. He tends
to the tree, putting stones around the base and making sure it has enough
water to survive Iraq's midsummer.
When his hour and a half is over, Saddam Hussein goes back to his cell.
Once, he had dominion over all of Iraq. Now, he is stripped of all the riches
and delusions; all he has left is a little time each day to cultivate a garden
that isn't even his.1
Saddam Hussein, the former Iraqi dictator, sits in solitary confine-
ment under the care of U.S. military police awaiting trial by the newly
minted Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) for a laundry list of crimes committed
during his thirty-three years in power. He was toppled by an American-led
invasion in March 2003, and remained in hiding until discovered by U.S.
forces in a six-foot underground "spider hole," armed only with a pistol
that he declined to use.2 He gardens while he waits for his trial.
f Associate Professor of Law, Creighton University. B.A., J.D., Indiana University;
LL.M.-International and Comparative Law, Georgetown University. Professor Kelly was
a contributor to the Cornell International Law Journal's Spring Symposium 2005
"Milo~evit and Hussein on Trial," and is author of NOWHERE TO HIDE: DEFEAT OF THE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DEFENSE FOR CRIMES OF GENOCIDE & THE TIAs OF SLOBODAN
MILOSEVIC AND SADDAM HUSSEIN (Peter Lang Publishers 2005).
1. Patrick Olsen & Chris Courtney, Saddam's New Life: Poetry and Gardening, CHI.
TRIB., July 27, 2004, at 12.
2. How Saddam Was Captured, BBC NEws, Dec. 15, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/world/middle east/3317881.stm. U.S. President George W. Bush ordered invasion
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The charges against Saddam include war crimes, crimes against
humanity, aggression, and genocide. 3 While each of these long-recognized
international crimes requires varying levels of proof and assertion unique
to the specific crime or its sub-component, genocide is perhaps the tricki-
est of the lot, requiring not mere intent, but specific intent to destroy an
identifiable group of people.4 Although it has been called the "crime of
crimes" since the experience of the Holocaust, genocide has traditionally
been the most difficult crime for prosecutors to prove.5
Formally outlawed in 1948, genocide has existed in practice from time
immemorial. Indeed, multiple biblical references discuss its use as a war
tactic against ethnically or religiously distinct cultures. 6 It was known in
the ancient world as a legitimate practice, used most famously by the
Romans against Carthage. 7 Throughout the Middle Ages and into the
modern era, genocide was regularly practiced until the slaughter of the
Armenians by the Ottoman Turks during World War 1.8 International out-
rage at the atrocity moved world opinion toward condemning genocide,
culminating in the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of Genocide ("Genocide Convention") in 1948 after World War II
and the Holocaust.9
The Genocide Convention provides the definition of genocide that
exists intact in many subsequent statutes, texts, and resolutions, including
the statute establishing the IST:
of Iraq without U.N. Security Council authorization in order to disarm Saddam Hus-
sein's regime, which was suspected of developing nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons in violation of international mandates. Jim Landers, Adviser: WMDs Given Up
by 1996 but Hussein Wanted to Rebuild Arms Program, Senate Panel Told, DALLAS MORN.
NEWs, Oct. 7, 2004, at 1A; Roy Eccleston, Bush Ends the Search for WMD, AuSTRALIAN,
Jan. 14, 2005, at LA. No such weapons have been found to date.
3. Defiant Saddam Rejects Court, Charges, CNN.coM, July 1, 2004, http://www.cnn.
com/2004/WORLD/meast/07/01/iraq.saddam/. The seven acts substantiating Hus-
sein's indictment are:
1. Anfal campaign against Kurds in the late 1980s;
2. Gassing Kurds in Halabja in 1988;
3. Invasion of Kuwait in 1990;
4. Crushing Kurdish and Shi'a rebellions after the 1991 Gulf War;
5. Killing political activists over thirty years;
6. Massacring members of Kurdish Barzani tribe in the 1980s; and
7. Killing religious leaders in 1974.
Saddam Trial Head Vows Justice, BBC NEws, July 2, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle_east/3859007.stm.
4. Matthew Lippman, Genocide: The Crime of the Century. The Jurisprudence of
Death at the Dawn of the New Millennium, 23 Hous. J. INT'L L. 467, 474, 485, 506-07
(2001).
5. WILLIAM A. ScHABAs, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 385 (2000).
6. Michael J. Kelly, Can Sovereigns be Brought to Justice? The Crime of Genocide's
Evolution and the Meaning of the Milosevic Trial, 76 Sr. JOHN's L. REv. 257, 260-61
(2002).
7. Id. at 262-64.
8. Id. at 267-69.
9. Id. at 272-81.
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[G]enocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 10
The elasticity of the definition is deceptive. While many fact patterns
may fit into the two required objective slots, namely, a protected group
(e.g., racial) and an act of destruction (e.g., killing), the definition is silent
as to just how widespread the acts must be. For example, do the acts have
to be pervasive enough to constitute widespread destruction as required for
a crime against humanity? Furthermore, most perpetrators go free on the
prosecution's inability to prove the subjective element of intent.
Judicial and legal authorities have interpreted the intent required for
genocide to be specific rather than general." Varying rationales exist for
this conclusion, but the higher threshold means more proof-proof that is
almost invariably difficult to come by in the form of intercepted conversa-
tions, correspondence, or documents that demonstrate the perpetrator's
state of mind at the time the genocide was carried out. Not all genocidaires,
as genocide perpetrators are known, meticulously catalogue, index, and
document their activities in excruciating detail as the Nazis did when car-
rying out Hitler's Final Solution. However, the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda (ICTR) determined in the 1999 case Akayesu that
specific intent to commit genocide can be successfully inferred through
context, thereby easing the way for this showing somewhat. 12
Charges of genocide against General Radislav Krstit at the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) failed precisely
because of the specific intent requirement. Krstit was convicted for the
1995 genocide that targeted and killed 8,000 Bosnian Muslims in Srebren-
10. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2,
opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
11. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Observations Concerning the 1997-98 Preparatory Commit-
tee's Work, 25 DEN. J. Ir'L L. & POL'Y 397, 413 (1997) (indicating that the requirement
for specific intent is a flaw in the definition of genocide).
12. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, 1998 WL 1782077, Judgment,
523 (Sept. 2, 1998):
lilt is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act
charged from the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts sys-
tematically directed against that same group, whether these acts were committed
by the same offender or by others. Other factors, such as the scale of atrocities
committed, their general nature, in a region or a country, or furthermore, the
fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their mem-
bership of a particular group, while excluding the members of other groups, can
enable the Chamber to infer the genocidal intent of a particular act.
985
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ica, on a theory of joint criminal enterprise. 13 However, his conviction was
overturned by the Appellate Chamber which concluded that, although the
Srebrenica genocide had occurred and others in the joint criminal enter-
prise shared a specific intent to carry it through, the evidence did not sup-
port the inference that Krstic had the required specific intent to destroy,
rather than mere knowledge. 14 It is because of this very high hurdle that
Slobodan Milo~evit is likely to be found guilty of only complicity in geno-
cide as opposed to genocide proper. Complicity only requires a showing
of knowledge.
As for Saddam Hussein, he will probably be found at least complicit in
the two genocides that occurred under his regime-the first against the
Iraqi Kurds of the north, and the second against the Marsh Arabs of the
south. 15 Whether he will be successfully convicted for genocide remains
an open question. The IST has no experience handling complex cases
based on international criminal conduct; however, by the time of Hussein's
trial, the tribunal may have developed that experience through trials of his
henchmen.
I. Saddam's Iraq: Environment Ripe for Genocide?
The modern state of Iraq is an artificial creation. It was constructed
by the British Foreign Office at the conclusion of World War I with an eye
toward offsetting French influence in the Middle East. During the course
of dismembering the defeated Ottoman Empire, the western powers also
cobbled together Palestine, Syria, and Trans-Jordan. Iraq was the fusion of
three Ottoman provinces: the Kurdish Sunni Mosul province, rich in oil
reserves; the Arab Sunni Baghdad province, the administrative center; and
the Arab Shi'a Basra province, also with oil wealth and a seaport. 16 Britain
served as the mandatory power under the League of Nations Mandate sys-
tem, charged with the responsibility of bringing Iraq and its other "man-
dates" along the road toward independence. 17
When Saddam took power in 1979, he was immediately confronted
with the problem of successfully governing a multiethnic, multireligious
state. Faced with the practical problem of consolidating power and gov-
erning Iraq, Saddam drew upon his cynical penchant for managing ethnic
politics in a manner similar to that of Tito, Yugoslavia's longtime dictator.
Like Tito, Saddam justified his iron-fisted rule as the only means of holding
the conglomerate of ethnically and religiously diverse people together.
13. Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, 2004 WL 2781931, Judg-
ment, ' 3 (April 19, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/Appeal/judge-
ment/krs-aj040419e.pdf.
14. Id. 19 134.
15. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, SADDAM HUSSEIN: CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES 14-16 (2002).
16. MARGARET MACMILLAN, PARIs 1919, 395-409 (2001); Vera Beaudin Saeedpour,
Establishing State Motives for Genocide: Iraq and the Kurds, in GENOCIDE WATCH 59,
67-68 (Helen Fien ed., 1992).
17. SIR ARNOLD T. WILSON, MESAPOTAMIA, 1917-1920: A CLASH OF LOYALTIES; A PER-
SONAL AND HISTORICAL RECORD 240-41 (1931).
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Figure 1: Ethnorel
Take that away, and Iraq, like Yugoslavia without Tito, might fly apart into
its constituent pieces, melting down into civil war in the process. For years,
the West turned a blind eye to the human rights situation in Iraq, encour-
aging instead the continued territorial integrity and stability of nation-
states most of which they had helped to create. 18
With tacit blessing from the West, Saddam was able to inflict grievous
harm on those who opposed his regime in Baghdad. His own ruling clan
within the Ba'ath Party was based in Sunni Islam-practiced by a minority
segment of the total Iraqi population, which consists of twenty percent
Sunni Arabs, seventeen percent Sunni Kurds, and sixty percent Shi'a Arabs.
For this additional reason, Saddam followed the pattern of other ethnic
minority governments in such states as South Africa, Rhodesia, Rwanda,
and Burundi, in brutalizing his own people to remain in power.
Underlying the political and power-based rationales for Saddam's
approach to governance were the economic concerns. As Figures 1 and 2
18. DALE ANDERSON, SADDAM HUSSEIN, A BIOGRAPHY 19-20 (2004) (noting that Euro-
pean countries helped set up governments in a number of Arab nations after World War
I).
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indicate rather starkly, the distribution of oil wealth, Iraq's primary source
of revenue, is inconveniently concentrated in the Kurdish and Shi'a regions
of Iraq's north and south, with very little left in the Sunni Arab lands in the
middle. The British recognized the value of the Kurdish area in the old
Mosul province as the linchpin for Iraq's economy in as early as 1917,
when Sir Arnold Wilson, acting commissioner for Mesopotamia, noted:
[T]he idea of Iraq as an independent nation had scarcely taken shape, for
the country lacked homogeneity, whether geographical, economic or racial
.... [I]t was scarcely to be hoped that the [v]ilayets of Basra and Baghdad
could maintain their existence as an autonomous state without the revenue
it was hoped might eventually be derived from the economic resources of the
Mosul [v]ilayet. Yet three-quarters of the inhabitants of the Mosul [v]ilayet
were non-Arab, five-eighths being Kurdish, and one-eighth Christians or
[non-Islamic Kurds]. 19
Figure 2: Oilfields and Facilities
Consequently, to retain adequate control over the wealth of the nation,
Saddam not only repressed the non-Sunni Arab populations in the north
and south, but also repopulated many districts with his Arab kinsmen-
19. WILSON, supra note 17, at ix-x.
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especially around the traditionally Kurdish area of Kirkuk. In the north,
the "Arabization" of oil-producing areas meant eviction of Kurdish farmers,
who were replaced with Arab tribesmen. Because the Iraqi Kurds were
politically divided, Saddam could play the factions off one another in
return for favors from Baghdad. He was able to take advantage of this dis-
unity continually to keep them in check and eventually to eliminate large
Kurdish populations altogether.20
Despite such varied justifications, Saddam's principal tactic of impos-
ing authority through terror went far beyond occasional arrests and execu-
tions of opponents. Although scores of Sunni Arabs fell victim to Saddam,
the Kurds and Shi'a were his primary targets. In both instances, the calam-
ities visited on these populations by Saddam's Sunni-dominant government
in Baghdad occurred during or just after general warfare with a foreign
power. As Christopher Greenwood, former counsel for Spain during Gen-
eral Pinochet's extradition hearings in London, noted in December 2003,
Saddam can be held accountable for genocide at least against the Kurds in
the north and the Shi'a Marsh Arabs in the south.2 1 The United States
supports genocide prosecutions on both counts.22
II. Genocide of the Kurds
Kurds, as a people, live in a divided world-some in Iraq, others in
Iran, Syria, and Turkey. The frontier between Iran and Iraq to a large
extent reflects the sixteenth-century collision of the expanding Persian and
Ottoman Empires. A subsequent treaty between Persians and Turks for-
malized a mountainous border region that indiscriminately split Arabic
Sunni and Shi'a as well as Kurdish populations on either side. This border
survived both World Wars, but was adjusted under the 1975 Algiers
Accords when Iraq's President Bakr ceded 518 square kilometers of oil-rich
territory adjacent to the Shatt al-Arab to Iran in exchange for Iran's agree-
ment to stop supporting Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. 23
By 1979, however, the political landscape had changed dramatically.
In Iraq, Bakr was dead, and Saddam had emerged as the undisputed
strongman. In Iran, the Shah had fled the country, and the ayatollahs were
completing their revolution amid continuing chaos. In the following year,
having consolidated his power and eliminated any immediate threat from
his enemies, Saddam sought to take advantage of the turmoil in neighbor-
ing Iran and restore the Iraqi lands lost under the Algiers Accords.
20. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MIDDLE EAST WATCH REPORT: GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: THE
ANFAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KURDS (1993) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH report],
available at http://hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/. For further discussion of the dis-
cordant political entities of the Iraqi Kurds, see MICHAEL M. GUNTER, THE KURDISH PREDIC-
AMENT IN IRAQ: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1999).
21. Christopher Greenwood, Focus: The Trial of Saddam Hussein, INDEPENDENT
(London), Dec. 21, 2003, at 12.
22. Neil A. Lewis, Iraqis Just Recently Set Rules to Govern Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
15, 2003, at A16.
23. For a closer look at the history of the Kurds, see DAVID McDOWALL, A MODERN
HISTORY OF THE KURDS (1996).
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In September 1980, Iraq's army crossed into Iran, advancing to the
outskirts of Abadan. 2 4 Ayatollah Khomeni used the invasion to in turn
consolidate his own power and rally Iranians to defend their homeland.
Thus began the great clash between two large oil producers that would
result in massive casualties on both sides during the ensuing eight years.
As with most Cold War conflicts, the world took sides. Islamic countries
were split between supporting secular Islam, personified by Saddam, and
fanatical Islam, personified by the Ayatollah. The superpowers supported
Iraq officially, but assisted Iran clandestinely, perhaps most embarrass-
ingly demonstrated by the Reagan Administration's secret sale of arms to
Iran that secured funding for the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua.
2 5
By 1982, Iran had reversed the Iraqi invasion, restoring the border
region. By 1984, Iran had driven into Iraq itself, secured the desert around
Basra in the south, and cut Iraq off from the Persian Gulf. Desperate to
restore the balance of the war and stem the gradual Iranian advance, Sad-
dam employed chemical weapons against Iranian forces. These proved an
effective method of offsetting the advantage of Iran's much larger troop
numbers. A recently declassified 1983 State Department memo assessing
Saddam's use of chemical weapons during this period and noting his per-
sonal order to employ chemical weapons, quotes Saddam as saying, "There
is a weapon for every battle, and we have the weapon that will confront
great numbers."'26
However, by the spring of 1987, Iran was also making significant
advances in the north, which Saddam correctly ascribed to assistance from
Iraqi Kurds. To deal with what was referred to in captured Iraqi documents
as "the Kurdish problem," Saddam tasked his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid,
leader of the Ba'ath Party's northern bureau, with the job of eradicating all
resistance, and granted him emergency powers to do so. A-Majid then
undertook a series of eight military campaigns against Kurdish "saboteurs"
from 1987 to 1989. What began as a counterinsurgency during wartime
ended in genocide, however. That the evidentiary trail so clearly tells the
story is a rarity in the annals of human rights, and is indeed a story in
itself.27
After Saddam lost the first Gulf War in 1991, his beleaguered troops
fell back under pressure from advancing forces led by Kurdish peshmerga
militia fighters who were reinforced by Kurdish refugees returning from
their cousins' homelands in neighboring Turkey and Iran. Although this
liberation of northern Iraq would prove fleeting as the United States with-
drew its support and allowed Saddam's forces to later return en masse to
put down the uprising, international nongovernmental organizations
24. For a detailed account of the Iran-Iraq War, see generally STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE,
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1992).
25. Michael Dobbs, U.S. Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup: Trade in Chemical Arms
Allowed Despite Their Use on Iranians, Kurds, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2002, at Al.
26. Memorandum from Jonathan Howe to Secretary of State Eagleburger, Iraqi Use
of Chemical Weapons (Nov. 21, 1983), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq25.pdf.
27. McDOWALL, supra note 23, at 347-50 (1996).
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seized the short window of opportunity to get into northern Iraq and dis-
pense aid to the returning populations as well as collect valuable evidence
on the genocide many believed had occurred there three years earlier. 28
Middle East Watch, a regional division of Human Rights Watch,
teamed up with Physicians for Human Rights to survey the mass graves
that were being uncovered by the locals. Over a ten-day period, several
mass graves were exhumed near the Kurdish cities of Erbil and
Suleimaniyeh. Large caches of Iraqi government and military records were
also captured as hastily evacuated secret police buildings and government
installations were stormed by advancing Kurds.
2 9
Peter Galbraith was dispatched by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee to broker a deal with the Kurds to secure the documents, as
Saddam was preparing to retake the north. Custody was secured with the
assistance of Middle East Watch, and, in 1992, fourteen tons of documents
were transferred to the committee where they remain to date. These,
together with the forensic findings of Physicians for Human Rights and
interviews conducted by Middle East Watch with 350 Kurdish survivors
and eyewitnesses of the genocide, form the basis of a 1993 report: The
Anfal Campaign against the Kurds.30
This report recounts the initial systematic bureaucratic groundwork
laid by al-Majid for his conduct of what would later become known as "the
Anfal":
In the first three months after assuming his post as secretary general of the
Ba'ath Party's Northern Bureau, Ali Hassan al-Majid began the process of
definition of the group that would be targeted by Anfal, and vastly expanded
the range of repressive activities against all rural Kurds. He decreed that
"saboteurs" would lose their property rights, suspended the legal rights of
all the residents of prohibited villages, and began ordering the execution of
first-degree relatives of "saboteurs" and of wounded civilians whose hostility
to the regime had been determined by the intelligence services.
In June 1987, al-Majid issued two successive sets of standing orders that
were to govern the conduct of the security forces through the Anfal cam-
paign and beyond. These orders were based on the simple axiom on which
the regime now operated: in the "prohibited" rural areas, all resident Kurds
were coterminous with the peshmerga insurgents, and they would be dealt
with accordingly.
The first of al-Majid's directives bans all human existence in the prohib-
ited areas, to be applied through a shoot-to-kill policy. The second, num-
bered SF/4008, dated June 20, 1987, modifies and expands upon these
orders. It constitutes a bald incitement to mass murder, spelled out in the
most chilling detail. In clause 4, army commanders are ordered "to carry
out random bombardments, using artillery, helicopters and aircraft, at all
times of the day or night, in order to kill the largest number of persons pre-
sent in these prohibited zones." In clause 5, al-Majid orders that, "All per-
sons captured in those villages shall be detained and interrogated by the
28. See Preface to HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH report, supra note 20 (describing how the
Human Rights Watch mission gathered evidence in Iraq).
29. Id.
30. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH report, supra note 20.
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security services and those between the ages of 15 and 70 shall be executed
after any useful information has been obtained from them, of which we
should be duly notified."
Even as this legal and bureaucratic structure was being set in place, the
Iraqi regime became the first in history to attack its own civilian population
with chemical weapons. On April 15, 1987, Iraqi aircraft dropped poison
gas on the [Kurdistan Democratic Party] headquarters at Zewa Shkan, close
to the Turkish border in Dohuk governorate, and the [Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan] headquarters in the twin villages of Sergalou and Bergalou, in the
governorate of Suleimaniyeh. The following afternoon, they dropped chemi-
cals on the undefended civilian villages of Sheikh Wasan and Balisan, killing
well over a hundred people, most of them women and children. Scores of
other victims of the attack were abducted from their hospital beds in the city
of Erbil, where they had been taken for treatment of their burns and blind-
ness. They have never been seen again. These incidents were the first of at
least forty documented chemical attacks on Kurdish targets over the suc-
ceeding eighteen months. 3 1
Al-Majid employed a variety of chemical weapons during the Anfal
campaign, including mustard gas-a blistering agent-and Sarin-a nerve
agent known as GB. His penchant for this method of extermination earned
him the sobriquet "Chemical Ali," a fearful reputation for brutality almost
matching that of Saddam himself. Galbraith, who secured the documen-
tary evidence for the Senate and later went on to become ambassador to
Croatia, characterized al-Majid as the "Josef Mengele of [the Anfal] opera-
tion," referring to the Nazi doctor who carried out experiments on Jews.
32
"It was a deadly experiment to see which of these weapons were the most
effective." 3
3
One survivor of al-Majid's April 1987 chemical attacks on Kurdish vil-
lages in the Balisan valley described the effect of the pink, gray, and yellow
gases drifting through the towns:
It was all dark, covered with darkness, we could not see anything .... It was
like a fog. And then everyone became blind. Some vomited. Faces turned
black; people experienced painful swellings under the arm, and women
under their breasts. Later, a yellow watery discharge would ooze from the
eyes and nose. Many of those who survived suffered severe vision distur-
bances, or total blindness for up to a month .... Some villagers ran into the
mountains and died there. Others, who had been closer to the place of
impact of the bombs, died where they stood.
34
All told, the Anfal campaign against the Kurds claimed between
50,000 and 100,000 lives by a conservative estimate. However, no single
action accounts for all the casualties. There were multiple mass murders,
multiple mass disappearances, forced displacement of hundreds of
thousands of noncombatants, destruction of 2,000 villages that were classi-
fied in Iraqi government documents as "burned," "destroyed," "demol-
31. Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH report, supra note 20.
32. Chemical Ali: Alive and Held, CBS NEws, Aug. 21, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2003/04/07/iraq/printable548099.shtml.
33. Id.
34. See McDOWALL, supra note 23, at 353.
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ished," or "purified," and the razing of a dozen larger Kurdish towns and
administrative centers. 35
It is the deadly combination of methods employed against the Kurds
during the eight Anfals that intertwine to form the most complete picture
of genocide. Although the successive gassings were perhaps the starkest
examples, conventional killing by shooting accounted for equal numbers of
deaths. For instance, the vast majority of Kurdish "detainees" were sent to
the Iraqi army base at Kirkuk known as Topzawa. Here, they were regis-
tered and segregated. Adult and teenage males were then loaded onto
closed trucks and taken to the execution grounds at places like Ramadi and
Hatra, where they were lined up next to large pits and shot. Once the
trenches were full, they were covered over. 3 6
The elderly were mostly bused to a concentration camp at Nuqra
Salman in the Iraqi desert, where death rates averaged four to five per day
from exposure and infection. The women and children went elsewhere.
They were usually taken to Dibs, a camp close to the Kirkuk-Mosul high-
way, where many of the children succumbed to dysentery and malnutri-
tion. About half of the women were taken to death pits like the one at
Samawa.3 7
Forced deportation, typically accompanied by the razing of villages,
was also a common feature of the Anfals. By the end of the campaigns, 1.5
million Kurds had been forcibly "resettled."3 8 This was part of an overall
scheme by Saddam to rearrange Kurdistan in northern Iraq, placing more
key areas under Arab control. During this process, 60,000 Kurds fled into
southeastern Turkey, exacerbating the refugee problems felt by the anxious
government in Ankara at that time.39
However, the gassing of Halabja was the single most horrific incident
during this notorious campaign, accounting for about 5,000 of the Anfal
deaths. Consequently, Halabja has become emblematic of the Kurdish
genocide, much as Srebrenica has become so for the Bosnian genocide.
Halabja had been captured in 1988 by rebel Iraqi Kurds with support from
Iranian forces, and crushing the resistance there became an ultimate prior-
ity for Saddam. Since Halabja was a city of 70,000 people, it was not tech-
nically a target of the Anfal, but General al-Majid turned his attention to it
along with his patently genocidal tactics.
According to a 2002 State Department report, al-Majid's coldly diabol-
ical approach can be discerned from his methodology of extermination.
Knowing that the gasses he intended to use were heavier than air and
would thus sink, he opened the March 16, 1988, attack on Halabja with a
conventional artillery bombardment for several hours, setting off the air
raid sirens. This drove the local Kurdish population down into tunnels,
35. See Introduction to HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH report, supra note 20.
36. McDOWALL, supra note 23, at 359.
37. Id. at 360.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also MICHAEL M. GUNTER, THE KURDS OF IRAQ: TRAGEDY AND HOPE 45
(1992).
Cornell International Law Journal
cellars, and basements. 40
Those underground shelters became gas chambers as al-Majid
unleashed his bombardment of poison. Aboveground, animals died and
birds dropped out of trees. Belowground, humans met their end, trapped.
Those who managed to scramble to the surface emerged into thick clouds
of chemical gas:
Dead bodies-human and animal-littered the streets, huddled in doorways,
slumped over the steering wheels of their cars. Survivors stumbled around,
laughing hysterically, before collapsing .... Those who had been directly
exposed to the gas found that their symptoms worsened as the night wore
on. Many children died along the way and were abandoned where they
fell. 4 1
As photos of dead children crumpled on steps or lying contorted and
bleached in the streets reached the world, an outcry arose from the human
rights community. But the response from the international community of
states was muted silence. 42 None could offer much beyond platitudes, as
they all had backed Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War with arms and
financing. Indeed, Germany is widely considered to have been the indus-
trial origin of the gas used by al-Majid during the Anfal campaign, and
Kurdish leaders have long accused France, Italy, and the Netherlands of
providing assistance to Saddam's chemical weapons program. 43
The United States was also implicated, as noted by James Tuite in his
background note to a 1992 Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee staff report assessing the use of chemical weapons by Saddam
against American troops in the first Gulf War:
[Ain inquiry was initiated by the Committee into the contributions that
exports from the United States played in the weapons of mass destruction
programs that have flourished under the direction of Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein.
On October 27, 1992, the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs held hearings that revealed that the United States had exported
chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile-system equipment to Iraq that was
converted to military use in Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
40. INT'L INFO. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Iraq: From Fear to Freedom 4 (Dec.
2002), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/iraq/homepage.htm.
41. McDOWA[L, supra note 23, at 358. Agiza, who was eight years old and out in the
fields when her village near Bahdinan was gassed, remembered seeing the planes come
in and dropping the bombs. She recalled an experience similar to those recounted by
survivors of Halabja:
It made smoke, yellowish-white smoke. It had a bad smell like DDT, the powder
they kill insects with. It had a bitter taste .... I saw my parents fall down with
my brother after the attack, and they told me they were dead. I looked at their
skin and it was black and they weren't moving. And I was scared and crying and
I did not know what to do. I saw their skin turn dark and blood coming out
from their mouths and from their noses. I wanted to touch them but they
stopped me and I started crying again.
Id. at 359.
42. Id. at 362.
43. Id. at 363.
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That Saddam possessed specific intent to commit genocide against the
Kurds depends on the prosecution's ability to marshal its documentary
and testimonial evidence. Perhaps such intent can be established if eyewit-
ness testimony like the following can stand up to cross-examination:
[W]e monitored . . . radio communications between the political and mili-
tary leadership .... Saddam Hussein briefed the assembled commanders
that there would be a chemical attack on Halabja and that soldiers should
wear protective clothing .... I heard a telephone conversation between Sad-
dam Hussein and Ali Hassan al-Majid. Saddam ordered him to form a work-
ing group .... After the meeting Ali Hassan al-Majid returned to the area
HQ .... Aerial pictures of Halabja after the attack were shown to Saddam
Hussein and other members of the Revolutionary Command Council.
One of the President's bodyguards brought 30 prisoners out. They were
Kurds. The President himself shot them one after another with a Browning
pistol. Another 30 prisoners were brought and the process was repeated.
Saddam Hussein was laughing and obviously enjoying himself. There was
blood everywhere-it was like an abattoir .... Those who were still alive
were eventually finished off by the security officers.
45
III. Genocide of the Marsh Arabs
The second genocide charge to be faced by Saddam involves the
destruction of the Marsh Arabs. The Marsh Arabs are an ethnically and
culturally unique group of Shi'a Arab tribes who have lived for five millen-
nia in the swath of the Fertile Crescent, where the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers meet in southern Mesopotamia (now Iraq) and create what was once
the largest swampland in the Middle East. They are wholly dependent
upon the marshlands for their sustenance and way of life, living in huts on
mounds composed of dried marsh reeds, fishing, raising water buffalo, and
traveling between settlements by boat along waterways that serve as
streets.46
The Sunni Arab Ba'athist regime in Baghdad, which had long dis-
trusted the Marsh Arabs, began draining of the marshes in earnest during
44. U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL EXPORTS TO IRAQ AND THEIR POSSIBLE IMPACT ON THE HEALTH CONSE-
QUENCES OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR (1994), reprinted in 140 CONG. REc. S15045, S15047
(1994). For recently declassified primary sources acknowledging U.S. support of Iraq's
chemical weapons program, see The National Security Archive, The Saddam Hussein
Sourcebook (Dec. 18, 2003), http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/special/iraq/index.htm.
See also Dobbs, supra note 25, at Al (referring to declassified government documents
that evidence U.S. support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War).
45. INDICT, Witness Statements, First Hand Accounts from Saddam's Brutal Regime,
available at http://www.indict.org.uk/witnessdetails.php?target=Saddam (last visited
Apr. 24, 2005). INDICT, a London-based NGO, collected witness statements with sup-
port from the British Parliament and U.S. Congress.
46. Tim Cornwell, Marshes Turned into Desert in an Act of Genocide, THE SCOTSMAN,
Sept. 24, 2002, at 12.
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the Iran-Iraq war.4 7 Seeking to offset Iranian military offenses in that
region, the Iraqi regime constructed large earthworks in the drained land
as defensive measures. Massive relocation efforts were undertaken, leading
in some cases to the Marsh Arabs' physical destruction. One British
reporter described the destruction of the group for the Financial Times in
matter-of-fact terms:
In old photographs, grave men and boys stare out from delicately-
arched, reed-thatched reception halls, or, mounted on their high-prowed
boats, pole past water buffalo as they hunt wild boar and spear fish.
But the Marsh Arabs and their reception halls have now all but disap-
peared. Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime hounded the Ma'adan, as they
are known, out of existence, ending a water-borne way of life that had not
changed in 5,000 years.
The retribution visited on the Ma'adan by the Ba'athists forms one of
the main charges of genocide leveled against Mr. Hussein and his associates.
"I was hung from a fan and tortured," says Qassim Alwan, sheikh of the
al-Maarada tribe near the village of Dayr on the Shatt el-Arab waterway
north of Basra ....
The Maarada were moved in the 1980s from their ancestral homelands,
on what is now the Majnoon oil field, to a collection of single-storey brick
houses standing in the desert. Majnoon was drained during the Iran-Iraq
war, when the regime constructed a series of giant earthworks to counter an
anticipated Iranian offensive.
"It took about two years. The water just stopped flowing in. Then the
soldiers came and we were told to leave," Mr. Alwan says.
"They promised us electricity and water and schools but to this day we
have nothing. These children cannot read or write," he says pointing to a
group of barefoot boys.
Of the nearly 9,000 sq km of once permanent marsh and lake in the
south of Iraq, the Ba'athist regime drained all but 10 percent, leaving noth-
ing but uncultivated desolation. The aim, according to outside experts and
Iraqis themselves, was 'purely political.
The population of the Marshes was put at 200,000 in 1991. Only
40,000 are now thought to be left-and only half of them are Ma'adan.
The rest have fled to Iran, have moved elsewhere in Iraq, or have been
murdered by the regime. The Ma'adan, nearly all of whom were Shi'a, had a
history of rebelliousness that put them directly at odds with Mr. Hussein.
[.. T]he drainage programme gathered pace in the wake of the failed
1991 Shi'a uprising .... 48
Many of the Marsh Arab tribes supported the Basra-based Shi'a upris-
ing following Saddam's defeat in the first Gulf War. Consequently, when
Saddam was allowed to crush the insurrection with his remaining fire-
power, the Marsh Arabs took their share of his fury. Napalm was loosed
against them, and gas was dropped to poison the water and kill the wildlife
47. Emma Nicholson, Case for Genocide: The Decimation of the Marsh Arabs, available
at http://www.emmanicholson.org.uk/downloads/Case%20for%2Genocide%20-%20
article.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
48. James Drummond, A People Destroyed by Saddam Yearn for 5,000-Year-Old Way of
Life, FINANcIAL TIMES (London), Apr. 21, 2003, at 6.
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in the marshes, thereby eliminating their food chain.49 The villages of the
most troublesome tribes were razed altogether.
The drainage project was accelerated after 1991. An Iraqi secret police
cache captured by rebel Kurdish forces when they took Shaqlawa during
their own uprising, contained documents titled "Plan of action for the mar-
shes."50 These documents laid out the blueprint for drainage of what was
described as a haven for Iran-backed Shi'a rebels sowing ethnic and politi-
cal dissent.5 ' Those who were not killed during the poisoning, drainage,
and razing process, and who did not remain on the fifteen percent of
marshland that survived, fled to neighboring Iran.52 Today, 95,000 Marsh
Arabs exist in refugee camps along the Iranian border, relying exclusively
on humanitarian aid handouts to survive. 53 Their homeland and way of
life have been decimated to such an extent that they, as a distinct people,
can be considered to have been "destroyed in part."54
These acts were accompanied by an attempt on the part of Saddam's
regime to dehumanize the Marsh Arabs, calling them "inferior and un-Iraqi
monkey-faced people."155 In addition to punishing the Marsh Arabs for
their support of the uprising following the first Gulf War, Saddam also
49. David Orr, Iraq "Poisons Marsh Arabs"; Mass Exodus into Iran as Saddam Assault
Threatens to Destroy Habitat, INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 27, 1994, at 13.
50. Cornwell, supra note 46.
51. Id. Such findings were supported by a British team that visited the area in 1994:
Mass poisoning has been added to Saddam Hussein's campaign of persecution
against the Marsh Arabs in southern Iraq, according to a British governmental
mission just returned from the region.
A team from the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), the first offi-
cial aid organisation to visit the area in recent years, found evidence that the
Marsh Arabs, much of whose ancient homeland has been drained by the Iraqi
government, are being poisoned by chemicals put into their water supply by the
authorities.
"I discovered symptoms of chronic long-term poisoning among many Iraqi
women, young men and children," said Mukesh Kapila, a doctor who led the
ODA mission to south-western Iran, where thousands of Iraqi refugees are seek-
ing sanctuary. "I also saw scars from bullets which people said had been fired
by Iraqi soldiers. There is no doubt that what is happening to the Marsh Arabs
in Iraq amounts to genocide."
In recent years, up to half a million people are estimated to have fled the
marshlands, the largest wetland ecosystem in the Middle East and home to the
Marsh Arabs for nearly 5,000 years. According to an Exeter University report
published this year, the marsh region-an area slightly smaller than Wales-will
disappear within the next decade or so if the Iraqi government continues to
drain it.
Already, between a half and three-quarters of the surface area has been
drained
Orr, supra note 49, at 13.
52. Assisting Marsh Arabs and Refugees (AMAR) Appeal, Humanitarian Activities:
Iraq, http://www.amarappeal.com/iraq.php (last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
53. Id.
54. Assisting Marsh Arabs and Refugees (AMAR) Appeal, The Marsh Arabs and the
Marshlands, http://www.amarappeal.com/marsharabs.php (last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
55. Wilfred Thesiger, Lords of the Lost Waters, GuARoLAN (London), Sept. 10, 1992, at
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sought to move them off the oilfields under the marshes. The oil reserves
in the now drained areas that were formerly covered with swampland are
described as "vast" and "untapped."
5 6
Thus, while the immediate motive for such cruel persecutions were a
combination of punishing for disloyalty and placing economic resources
under greater control of the central government, those intentions could
have evolved along the way to one of genocidal destruction of the group-
an admittedly high bar for prosecution on this charge. Secretary of State
Colin Powell referred to their persecution as "ethnic cleansing against the
Shi'ite Iraqis and the Marsh Arabs, whose culture has flourished for more
than a millennium. 5 7
The most persistent Western surrogate pressing for Saddam's prosecu-
tion on genocide charges for destruction of the Marsh Arabs is Baroness
Emma Nicholson, British member of the European Parliament:
Evidence collected and reported during the last 20 years clearly shows
that the actions taken by the Iraqi government against the Marsh Arabs con-
stitute genocide. The international community, the coalition and/or the
United Nations is therefore obligated to investigate and prosecute those
responsible for this heinous crime.
Now that Saddam has been captured, there is a unique opportunity to
bring those who committed this genocide to account.
The evidence shows that [the] Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein car-
ried out concerted and planned actions that targeted and destroyed the
Marsh Arabs as a group: military attacks that killed and injured large num-
bers of civilians, and exhaustive draining of the Marshlands in order to cre-
ate conditions in which the group could not survive. Consequently, the
Marsh Arabs are on the verge of extinction, clearly victims of genocide.
In accordance with their obligations under international law, states
must now ensure that the perpetrators of genocide against the Marsh Arabs,
including Saddam, are brought to trial, and must give all assistance to the
new authorities in Iraq for this to happen .... 58
In response to a 1992 accusation of genocide against the Marsh Arabs,
Iraq's parliamentary speaker Saadi Mehdi Saleh retorted, "America wiped
the Red Indians off the face of the earth and nobody raised an eyebrow."'59
The parallel he was making refers implicitly to the nineteenth-century U.S.
56. Robert W. Gee, Once Fertile Marshlands Have Become Parched Earth, ATLANTAJ.-
CONST., May 12, 2003, at 4A.
57. Colin Powell, Powell's Address, Presenting 'Deeply Troubling' Evidence on Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at A18; Vasuki Nesiah, From Berlin to Bonn to Baghdad: A Space for
Infinite Justice, 17 H~Auv. HUM. RTs. J. 75, 97 (2004) ("The treatment of the Kurds and
Marsh Arabs in particular constituted violations of the Genocide Convention that war-
ranted intervention.").
58. Nicholson, supra note 47.
59. Aaron Schwabach, Ecocide and Genocide in Iraq: International Law, the Marsh
Arabs, and Environmental Damage in Non-International Conflicts, 15 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL
L. & POL'Y 1, 8 (2004) (quoting JOHN FAWCETr & VICTOR TANNER, THE BROOKINGS INSTITU-
TION, SAIS PROJECT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE OF IRAQ
32 (2002)).
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government policy of eradicating the buffalo herds of the Great Plains,
thereby decimating the Native American population in that area by sub-
tracting its means of subsistence. 60 The marsh was a similar means of sub-
sistence for the Marsh Arabs.
IV. Saddam's Downfall and Indictment
Saddam, once a friend and ally of the United States, forfeited that posi-
tion when he invaded Kuwait in 1990, justifying his invasion as a forcible
reincorporation of a renegade province. This strategic miscalculation cost
him dearly. Saudi Arabia, the Arab states of the gulf, and the United States
viewed Kuwait's occupation as a threat to the world's oil supply and
surmised that his aggression would not stop with Kuwait. Thus, a coalition
was formed and was duly blessed by the U.N. Security Council to invade
Kuwait and repel the Iraqi army.
Although the coalition forces successfully repelled the Iraqis in Janu-
ary 1991, they stopped short of invading and occupying Iraq completely,
which would have gone beyond the coalition's U.N. mandate of restoring
Kuwaiti sovereignty. Subsequently, the United States and Britain jointly
established "no-fly zones" in the north and south of Iraq that were
patrolled over the ensuing decade by jet fighters and reconnaissance
planes. These zones were created ostensibly to protect the Kurds in the
north and the Shi'a in the south.6 1 The results were decidedly mixed.
America and the world were largely satisfied with this policy of con-
tainment coupled with economic sanctions imposed upon Saddam's
regime to keep him weak and to defuse his ability to threaten his neighbors.
After the terrorist attacks suffered by the United States on September 11,
2001, at the hands of Islamist Arab Osama bin Laden and his fundamental-
ist al-Qaeda network, the United States shifted its policy position with
regard to terrorism from one of deterrence to one of preemption and active
prevention. 6 2 President Bush promised to hunt down terrorists wherever
they were and bring down the regimes of states that harbored them. This
policy was extended to include states pursuing development of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). 63
Based on what turned out to be faulty intelligence, the President was
convinced that Saddam had retooled his ability to pursue WMD and was
close to perfecting a nuclear weapon. Logically, containment could no
longer work. With. the backing of Congress, the President went to the
United Nations and secured new resolutions to resume weapons inspec-
60. Id. at 8 n.36.
61. No-fly Zones: The Legal Position, BBC NEws, Feb. 19, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/1/hi/world/middle east/1175950.stm.
62. Judith Richards Hope & Edward N. Griffin, The New Iraq: Revising Iraq's Com-
mercial Law Is a Necessity for Foreign Direct Investment and the Reconstruction of Iraq's
Decimated Economy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 875, 881 (2004).
63. WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 13-16 (Sept. 2002), available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (last visited
Apr. 20, 2005).
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tions in Iraq to find and destroy that capability. Under Security Council
Resolution 1441, Saddam produced 12,000 pages of documents disclosing
his WMD programs. But this was rejected by both the United States and
chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix as incomplete. 6 4
Britain and the United States urged the Security Council to authorize
military action for the noncompliance, but France, Germany, and Russia
blocked such action until the inspectors could complete their work.65 Fear-
ful that such delay would allow Saddam another year to develop weapons,
Britain and the United States formed a new coalition to invade Iraq and
forcibly remove Saddam from power. Since a military campaign season in
the desert cannot last into the summer heat, the coalition lost no time and
dispatched ground forces, securing Baghdad in April 2003 after a lengthy
bombing campaign.66
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established to govern
Iraq during the occupation, and the military was redeployed throughout
the country to hunt down the WMD and capture Saddam and other
Ba'athist leaders, who had all fled Baghdad during the fighting. In Decem-
ber 2003, Saddam was captured where he was hiding outside of Tikrit.
Taken into custody and held by coalition forces, he was accorded prisoner
of war (POW) status as a military leader.6 7
V. The Iraqi Special Tribunal
Even before Saddam's capture, the CPA and its adjunct Iraqi Gov-
erning Council were faced with the question of trial venues for captured
war criminals. As the table below indicates, the trial options were many
and varied, but one in particular presented itself as a method for retaining
the most control over events while simultaneously conferring maximum
legitimacy on the proceedings from the perspective of Iraqis-establish-
ment of a domestic special tribunal.
A truth commission was never a realistic option, from either the
domestic American or Iraqi political perspective. Retribution figures high
on the list of criminal justice goals in both cultures and is reflected in their
justice systems. Accordingly, taking the truth commission option would be
viewed in both societies as "letting Saddam off the hook." Likewise, an
international tribunal presented a false option due primarily to the fact
that one would have to be created from scratch; moreover, the Bush admin-
istration has amply demonstrated its disdain for working with interna-
tional bodies.
64. Hope & Griffin, supra note 62, at 882.
65. Ian Fisher, Threats and Resposes: Weapons Inspections; Top Iraqi Advisor Says He
Believes War Is Inevitable, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2003, at Al.
66. Hope & Griffin, supra note 62, at 882.
67. John Hendren, Pentagon Labels Hussein a POW, Conferring Him Special Rights,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2004, at Al. For the criteria of prisoner of war status, see Jordan J.
Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the
Status of Persons, Treatment, judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military
Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1335, 1352 (2004).
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Venue Option Rationale/Accompanying Issues
Truth Commission This option calls for no trial at all. South Africa successfully
employed a truth and reconciliation commission that exchanged
amnesty for criminal conduct for testimony and acknowledgement of
acts committed in furtherance of Apartheid.
International The U.N. Security Council would have to create an ad hoc
Tribunal International Iraqi War Crimes Tribunal. Currently, there is no
international court that could hear Saddam's case. The International
Court of Justice only has definitive jurisdiction over states; the new
International Criminal Court only has prospective jurisdiction over
crimes committed after July 2002; and the existing tribunals for
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone only have jurisdiction over the
criminal events that unfolded in those conflicts.
Possible Models:
1. Yugoslav Model: Purely international (location away from
country of crime and int'l judges and prosecutors only).
2. Sierra Leone Model: Both international and domestic (location
in country of crime and both international and domestic judges
and prosecutors).
Military Tribunal Under international law, the United States has the option to try
Saddam before an American military tribunal. However, his status as
a POW would bring all the protections of the Third Geneva
Convention into play.
U.S. Federal Just as Article Ill courts successfully tried Manuel Noriega after the
Court American invasion of Panama, U.S. federal courts could conceivably
try Saddam since genocide is criminalized by federal statute and the
crime is accorded universal jurisdiction.
Special Iraqi The IST was created by the Iraqi Governing Council to try war
Domestic Court criminals such as Saddam. The IST would have jurisdiction over
Saddam and his henchmen for genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity.
While the Pentagon is convening military tribunals to try captured al-
Qaeda and Taliban in the U.S.-led war on terror, no Iraqis are specifically
being singled out for trial by military commission. Saddam would be no
exception. Such tribunals are regarded as necessarily operating in a vac-
uum-which Iraq, unlike Afghanistan, is not-and part of the stated goal
for liberating Iraq was to reimbue it with democratic rule-of-law institu-
tions. Thus, taking war crimes' trials away from the Iraqis would be seen
as denying them the opportunity to let justice take its course within Iraq.
The same justification would apply for not trying Saddam in American fed-
eral courts.
Yet another, perhaps more powerful reason for not trying Saddam in a
military tribunal or a U.S. federal court is the perspective of the Arab street.
From their vantage point rooted in the Arabic-Islamic honor code, it would
be fine for Osama bin Laden to be tried in the United States because he
struck the United States first. Saddam is another matter, however, because
he was toppled from power after a full-scale invasion and occupation.
From the Arab perspective, therefore, Saddam should be subjected to
Arabic justice.
For these reasons, the domestically constituted IST was viewed as the
most realistic venue option for trying Saddam. Promulgated just a few
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days before his capture for trying the Ba'athist henchmen already arrested,
the IST will consist of Iraqi judges and prosecutors dispensing Iraqi justice
against Iraqi defendants. Although the statute establishing the IST care-
fully contains all the accoutrements that allow it to be described as domes-
tic justice, international "guidance" is encouraged and, in some cases,
required.
When the CPA drafted the statute of the IST, it specifically sought to
avoid many of the problems associated with the Milogevit trial in The
Hague. A major difference is that the IST is a domestic Iraqi court that
exists within the Iraqi judicial system under the authority of the Iraqi gov-
ernment. Article 1 of the statute limits the IST's temporal jurisdiction to
crimes committed in Iraq or elsewhere between the Ba'athists' assumption
of power on July 17, 1968, and their deposition on May 1, 2003. It specifi-
cally incorporates liability for crimes committed during the wars with Iran
and Kuwait and for crimes committed against Iraqi ethnic or religious
groups, whether during armed conflict or not. The IST has adjudicatory
power only over people, not parties or corporate entities.68
The IST's subject matter jurisdiction is limited as well. It can under-
take prosecutions only for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity
as defined largely by international law, and a small set of domestic Iraqi
violations, including invading other Arab countries, wasting natural
resources, abusing power, squandering public funds and assets, and
attempting to manipulate the judiciary. Judges are appointed by the Iraqi
government to trial chambers and a nine-member appellate body, which
may include non-Iraqi nationals at the government's discretion. Provision
is also made for creation of a twenty-member body of permanent "investi-
gative judges," who will issue subpoenas, arrest warrants, and indictments,
as well as collect and evaluate evidence, essentially building up the cases
for the court.6
9
Each investigative judge is a separate organ and independent from the
tribunal judges. Interestingly, the chief investigative judge is required to
appoint non-Iraqi foreign "advisors" to act in an assistant or observer
capacity while also monitoring the work of the Iraqi investigative judges, to
ensure that general due process standards are observed. Similarly, up to
twenty prosecutors will be appointed by the government and be accompa-
nied by international advisors who will monitor their work. 7°
Whether these international advisors are drawn from other Arab states
or Western countries could be a potential legitimacy issue for the tribunal.
The least legitimacy would be accorded the IST if it incorporated U.S. mili-
tary JAG officers as advisors. However, appointment of professional staff
from the new International Criminal Court or other truly international
judicial bodies would give greater legitimacy to the IST. Currently, the
68. Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, Dec. 10, 2003, 43 I.LM. 231, available at
http://iraq-ist.org/en/about/statute.htm.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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thirty-nine judges who have been appointed are considering hiring interna-
tional law clerks to assist them in the trial and opinion-drafting process.
Borrowing from the statutes establishing the ICTY and ICTR, the stat-
ute of the IST also does away with the defenses of sovereign immunity and
superior orders while building in the command responsibility logic for
criminal liability. The new IST is also determined to learn from the mis-
takes of the Milo~evit trial in order to exercise better control over the defen-
dant while still treating him fairly, impose counsel when necessary, limit
the prosecution's introduction of evidence so as not to unduly prolong the
trial, and so on.
Following his appointment as head of the IST in early 2004, Salem
Chalabi led a delegation of Iraqi judges and prosecutors to The Hague in
April 2004 to meet, over a period of three days, with jurists from the ICTY
and the new International Criminal Court. Hoping to draw on their exper-
iences, Chalabi said, "We do not want this tribunal to be the... ultimate
historian of the atrocities of the previous regime. We want it to be about
justice. And so we need to make sure the cases are properly prepared, that
they're scrutinized appropriately, and the trials are fair. And this will take
some time." 7 1
During the spring of 2004, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) person-
nel began providing support to the new IST in the form of logistics and
evidence collection. To this end, a DOJ Regime Crimes Liaison Office was
established in Baghdad and was given a budget of $75 million. The chief
challenge faced by the staff attempting to marshal incriminating evidence
is the deteriorating local security situation. For example, to exhume a
mass grave-a process that takes two months, earth-moving equipment
must be transported to the site, locals must be kept at bay, and a significant
military contingent must be present around the clock, diverted away from
other patrols and duties.7 2
Gregory Kehoe, formerly a prosecutor with the ICTY, was put in
charge of the DOJ extension office. Kehoe noted:
We are purely, again, in a support role as a liaison. What the problem in
Iraq with the Saddam regime is that an infrastructure wasn't present to assist
in these investigations. What we are attempting to do is gather information
from various quarters, not only in the United States, but throughout the
world, and provide the Iraqis with that information. And they then will
develop that information through their investigative judges to decide what
charges should be brought and against whom.73
Notoriously unpredictable Iraqi politics have already taken their toll
on the IST. Salem Chalabi was deposed as head of the tribunal in Septem-
71. Interview by Mary Lou Finley with Salem Chalabi, As It Happens (CBC radio
broadcast Apr. 21, 2004).
72. Thanassis Cambanis, Despite Allawi's Vow, U.S. Official Says Trial Won't Be This
Year, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 25, 2004, at A9.
73. Interview by Bill Hemmer with Gregory Kehoe, American Morning (CNN televi-
sion broadcast May 12, 2004), transcript available at http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/0405/12/ltm.04.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
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ber 2004 when murder charges were brought against him, even though the
charges were later dropped, and was replaced by Amer Bakri. Chalabi con-
tends that he was pushed aside for political reasons because his uncle,
Ahmed-who runs the Iraqi National Congress and is a rival of the prime
minister-fell out of favor with the United States after it became known that
he was spying for Iran. 74
When it decided to create a domestic tribunal filled with Iraqi judges
and prosecutors, the CPA may not have weighed the downside of the new
IST being undermined by local politics. Then again, under intense politi-
cal pressure from Washington to transfer sovereignty to Iraq on schedule at
the end of June 2004, the CPA may not have had the time to consider all the
alternatives fully.
High-level Iraqi judges who served during Saddam's reign have been
excluded from serving, as have Iraqis who were in exile during that period.
The judges who have been selected are typically low-level individuals, not
deemed sufficiently Ba'athist to have owed any allegiance to Saddam. This
in turn opens them up to challenge by the defense that they are not quali-
fied to serve due to their lack of experience with crimes of genocide,
aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Thus, the judges are
undergoing a continuing training program that has taken them to Dubai
and London.7 5
At the end of June 2004, Saddam was stripped of his POW status, was
transferred to the new Iraqi government, and was accorded the status of
Iraqi criminal detainee. 76 As such, he was able to hire counsel before he
underwent a formal arraignment hearing the next day, although his coun-
sel were not present for the initial charging proceedings.
VI. Proving Genocide Against Saddam
When he was arraigned before an unidentified judge sitting for the
IST, Saddam arrived in civilian clothes and chains, which were removed by
his guards upon entering the courtroom. His indictment charges included
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. Saddam
was defiant during the hearing, refusing to sign the charges as directed by
the judge. 77
Unlike Milogevit who is acting as his own attorney at The Hague, Sad-
dam will be represented by attorneys, possibly including Jacques Verges, a
seventy-eight-year-old French criminal defense lawyer who famously repre-
sented Carlos the Jackal twenty years ago. Asked as to whether he would
base a defense of Saddam on the complicity of western countries, Verges
responded:
74. Cambanis, supra note 72.
75. Michael P. Scharf, Can This Man Get a Fair Trial?, WASH. PosT, Dec. 19, 2004, at
Bl.
76. Charles Crain, Saddam Is Placed under Iraqi Control, ATLANTA J.-CoNsT., July 1,
2004, at A6.
77. Defiant Saddam Rejects Court, Charges, CNN.com, July 1, 2004, http://www.
cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/07/01/iraq.saddam/.
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During the Reagan administration. . . [Donald] Rumsfeld himself was in
charge of some key relations with the Iraqi authorities .... Western coun-
tries sold weapons to Saddam. Western countries encouraged the war
against Iran. Western countries were present in Iraq through diplomatic
delegations. They weren't blind .... Obviously, in the course of a trial, the
fundamental element will be: "you treat me like a pariah, but I was your
friend. What we did, we did together. I fired the bullet, but you're the one
who gave me the gun-you even pointed out the enemy."
78
It is evident from Verges's statement that the defense strategy will, like
in Milogevit's case, seek to apportion blame to the West. However, Sad-
dam's version may actually admit that he is a monster and seek to pin
accomplice liability on the West. One lawyer from his rather amorphous
twenty-member defense team immediately sought to challenge the court's
legitimacy by suggesting publicly that Saddam could not receive a fair trial
before an Iraqi national tribunal. Instead, the lawyer demanded moving
the case to an international tribunal because it involved international
crimes. 79
Although another of Saddam's attorneys has argued that the Geneva
Conventions prohibit an occupying power from dissolving domestic courts
and creating its own, there is clear provision in the treaty for creation of
military commissions that follow the strictures of due process.8 0 Moreo-
ver, the CPA was careful to clothe creation of the IST as an extension of the
Iraqi Governing Authority. Although that CPA-appointed body is close to
the occupying power, it may not be close enough to support this aspect of
the defense's challenge to the IST's legitimacy. In any case, the newly
elected Iraqi assembly will likely bless the IST, extending its own represen-
tative legitimacy to the tribunal. 8 1
The genocide charges will be individualized: One for the Kurds and
one for the Marsh Arabs. The fact that Saddam brought up the subject of
Halabja on his own during the arraignment8 2 indicates that the atrocity
there weighs heavily on his mind. How balanced that mind is remains to
be seen. At one point, Saddam, in a flash of paranoia, dismissed his
arraignment as political "theatre" orchestrated by Bush to help him in his
78. Eric Pape and Marie Valla, Defending Saddam, NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE, Dec.
30, 2003, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3840489/.
79. Saddam Trial Head Vows Justice, BBC NEWS, July 2, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/middleeast/3859007.stm.
80. For an argument that the United States, as an occupying power, has the responsi-
bility under international law to restore law and order in Iraq, see Jordan J. Paust, The
U.S. as Occupying Power Over Portions of Iraq and Relevant Responsibilities Under the
Laws of War, ASIL INSIGHTS, Apr. 2003, http://www.asil.org/insights/insighl02.htm.
81. Argument of Curtis F. Doebbler in debate with Prof. Michael P. Scharf, Can Sad-
dam Hussein Receive a Fair Trial? (C-SPAN television broadcast Jan. 30, 2005) (debate at
Case Western Reserve School of Law on Jan. 13, 2005), transcript available at http://
www.cspanstore.org/shop/index.php?mainpage=productvideoinfo&productsid=
184702-1.
82. Transcript of Saddam in Court, MSNBC NEWS, July 1, 2004, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/5345118/.
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reelection campaign.83
For the prosecution, the case for genocide of the Kurds will be much
easier to make than the case for genocide of the Marsh Arabs. The Kurds
are an ethnic group distinct from their Sunni Arab persecutors. They suf-
fered from systematic persecution over a long period that included direct
group killing, razing of villages, gassing of civilians, and internment in a
network of camps and detention centers controlled from a central bureau-
cracy that orchestrated this destruction at the national, regional, and local
levels. The portion of the genocide definition implicated here is "destroyed
in whole or in part."
The case for genocide of the Marsh Arabs is more tenuous, however.
The Marsh Arabs are a cultural and religious group also distinct from their
Sunni Arab persecutors, but their partial destruction was the result of a
more indirect method-draining the marshes on which they relied for sub-
sistence. The portion of the genocide definition implicated here is "deliber-
ately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part." Moreover, documentary evi-
dence of coordinated state policy to commit genocide against the Marsh
Arabs is not as abundant as the evidence that will be used to support the
Kurdish genocide charge. Consequently, the case of the Marsh Arabs will
be the weaker of the two genocide indictments if the prosecution decides to
label it genocide instead of a crime against humanity.
Typically, proof that genocide occurred is easier to produce than proof
of intent to commit the crime. Prosecutors will show physical acts that
characterize genocide with abundant witness testimony, documentary evi-
dence, and increasing physical evidence as mass graves continue to be
unearthed. For instance, when the Anfal campaign was unfolding, the U.S.
Senate recognized it as genocide, as recounted by then-chair of the Foreign
Relations Committee, Claiborne Pell, speaking at a 1992 hearing:
It was just 4 years ago that I introduced, and the Senate passed, legislation
imposing comprehensive financial and economic sanctions against Iraq.
Our legislation was entitled "The Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988."
In the relevant part, the act said the Iraqi army has undertaken a campaign
to depopulate the Kurdish regions of Iraq by destroying Kurdish villages in
much of northern Iraq and by killing the civilian population.
Iraq's campaign against the Kurdish people appeared to constitute an
act of genocide. At the time, both the Reagan administration and the House
conferees vehemently objected to characterizing Iraqi conduct in Kurdistan
as genocide. We now know that that description was very apt.
In 1987, Iraq initiated a campaign to depopulate Iraqi Kurdistan. The
military operation, code named the Al-Anfal campaign, encompassed the
systematic destruction of every village in Kurdistan, the massive use of
chemical weapons against defenseless villagers, and the deportation and
execution of tens of thousands of men, women, and children.
In all, at least 180,000 people died in the A1-Anfal campaign; about 5
percent of the population of Iraqi Kurdistan. Had the gulf war not inter-
83. In Court, Saddam Says Bush Is "the Criminal", MSNBC NEWS, July 1, 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5323918.
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vened, it is likely that Iraq's Kurdish population would have been
exterminated.
There was, in 1987 and 1988, clear evidence of Iraq's conduct. In 1987,
the Foreign Relations Committee published a staff report revealing the sys-
tematic destruction of Kurdish villages. In 1988, our committee published
another staff report documenting the extent of use of chemical weapons
against Kurdish civilians.
That report, which is the only published American Government docu-
mentation on the actual use of chemical weapons since World War I,
described Iraqi actions as having many of the characteristics of genocide. It
also described the machinegun killing of Kurdish civilians and burials in
mass graves.8 4
Beyond proving that the acts constituted genocide, the prosecution
must prove the mental element-the specific intent on the part of the perpe-
trators that destruction of the target population was the goal. As in the
Milogevit trial, the toughest hurdle for the prosecution to overcome will be
proving Saddam's specific intent. Saddam's lawyers will not make this job
easy; they will argue alternative multiple intents. With respect to the geno-
cide of the Kurds, Saddam will argue that it was never his intent to destroy
them. Rather, his primary intent was to impose greater central control over
the oilfields underlying traditionally populated Kurdish areas in the north,
and his secondary intent to combat Kurdish forces assisting Iran during
the Iran-Iraq War.
For proof of the primary intent, Saddam will point to national security
concerns associated with allowing a restive, potentially breakaway popula-
tion to remain in control of the country's largest oil reserves. He will argue
that his draconian forced migration policies were geared to this end, and
that to the extent that large numbers of Kurds died, it was because they
resisted. To break this resistance, harsh methods like use of concentration
camps and gas had to be employed-but not to kill them as a group, only to
frighten them into compliance.
In fact, the economic security theme is one that is likely to recur as a
defense. Saddam's attorneys may use it as an underlying point, not only to
escape conviction for the Kurdish genocide, but also to escape conviction
for the Marsh Arab genocide and for the war crimes, aggression, and
crimes against humanity charges in connection with the occupation of
Kuwait. If the defense attorneys can convince the judge that Saddam's
intent was to secure Iraq's economic wealth by invading Kuwait and depop-
ulating the Kurdish and Marsh Arab areas-thereby securing the oilfields
in all three-then the prosecution's showing of intent becomes much
harder. The prosecutor has to not only show the requisite evil intent, but
also demonstrate that the alternative intent is not plausible.
For proof of the secondary intent, namely, the intent to combat Kurd-
ish forces assisting Iran in its war against Iraq, Saddam will produce evi-
dence of collusion between Kurdish and Iranian forces during the
84. Mass Killings in Iraq: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102d
Cong. 1 (1992) (statement of Claiborne Pell, Chairman).
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Iran-Iraq War. He will argue that fighting the Iranians and fighting the
Iraqi Kurds were one and the same thing from the Iraqi perspective. That
Kurdish forces took Halabja in 1988 with support from Iranian forces as
they crossed into northern Iraq legitimized the attack by Iraqi forces on
that city as a military necessity. Saddam will contend that while it was
unfortunate that 5,000 Iraqi Kurds died during combat, his intent was not
to kill civilians outright but to retake a strategically important area.
To escape conviction'for the Marsh Arab genocide, Saddam will reiter-
ate the economic angle and add that in addition to securing the oil wealth
in the south, he was ferreting out Iranian sympathizers-a process that was
begun during the Iran-Iraq War with the establishment of defensive posi-
tions in the marsh areas.
The prosecution must blunt these alternative intent theories. Geogra-
phy helps them to undermine the secondary alternative intent theory for
the Anfal campaign-that Saddam was combating Kurds colluding with Ira-
nian forces during wartime. The majority of Kurdish villages gassed or
destroyed during the Anfals were either on the border with Turkey, not
Iran, or some distance inland from the Iranian border where most of the
military incursions were taking place.8 5 Moreover, those targeted by the
Anfals were civilians, not military forces or armed Kurds.
The prosecution may choose to admit the logic of counterinsurgency
as the underlying idea for creation of the Anfal and to argue that the
counterinsurgency nonetheless evolved into genocide. As one genocide
researcher for Human Rights Watch notes, "the fact that Anfal was, by the
narrowest definition, a counterinsurgency, does nothing to diminish the
fact that it was also an act of genocide. There is nothing mutually exclusive
about counterinsurgency and genocide. Indeed, one may be the instru-
ment used to consummate the other."8 6
The economic rationale of the primary alternative intent theory is
harder to attack, but with some reverse engineering the prosecution may be
able to undermine it as well. For example, in a damning quote drawn from
one of many audio tapes captured by the United States and translated by
the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), al-Majid discusses the
Anfals: "Tell him I will strike. I will strike with chemicals and kill them all.
What is the international community going to say? The hell with them and
the hell with any other country in the world that objects."8 7 If that evident
genocidal intent can be imputed back up the chain to Saddam, then Sad-
dam's alternative explanations may collapse.
The prosecution will be helped considerably by the fact that so many
survivors of Saddam's genocidal policies are volunteering to present evi-
dence against him. In relation to the attack on Halabja, a female student at
85. Saeedpour, supra note 16, at 66.
86. George Black, Report on al-Anfal, in THE SADDAM HUSSEIN READER 189, 199 (Turi
Munthe ed., 2002).
87. The Fifth Estate- The Forgotten People: The Attack at Halabja (CBC News broad-
cast Mar. 26, 2003), available at http://www.cbc.ca/fifth/kurds/attack.html (last visited
Apr. 24, 2005).
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that time was rounded up with other students and paraded before Saddam
at military headquarters in Suleimaniyah. She saw him on a green tele-
phone and heard him distinctly give the order to bombard the city. "I
would like to testify that I saw him make that phone call that day. I think
the matter has come alive again, and now we will see justice." An Arab
Iraqi from Baghdad who witnessed planes loaded with "unusual" weapons
at the Arbil airfield that morning wants to tell his story in court as well.88
Lack of knowledge is another defense Saddam will raise-which also
goes to the establishment of specific intent. As Milogevit has done, Sad-
dam will claim that he was unaware of the activities of his subordinates.
This defense may fail, however, if the prosecution properly asserts the com-
mand responsibility doctrine that imputes knowledge up the chain of com-
mand to leaders who reasonably should have known what was happening.
The tu quoque ("you too") defense was rejected at Nuremberg and at the
ICTY in the Milogevit case.8 9 To the extent that this defense is raised to a
genocide charge, it will involve the United States and the West's supplying
him the means and assistance to carry out his actions. It will lose its force
on a domestic tribunal, however, and an argument that Iran used chemical
weapons first-which is itself disputed-would similarly be lost on an Iraqi
court.
Saddam's attorneys have indicated their intention to raise the sover-
eign immunity defense.90 Even though it has eroded significantly in inter-
national law, it may yet retain some salience in domestic law. To succeed,
however, his attorneys acknowledge that they would have to show that the
American-led invasion of Iraq was illegal under international law, and
therefore, by extension, Saddam is still legally the head of state. This strat-
egy is of course based on political bias and rather murky assertions:
Arab lawyers representing deposed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein plan
to appeal to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to take action to end their
client's "illegal detention" and bring him back to power.
Annan's recent declaration that the liberation of Iraq by the US-led coa-
lition was "illegal" has been welcomed by Saddam's lawyers, who believe the
secretary-general should make "the necessary moves" to restore their client
as president of Iraq.
"It is now clear that the occupation... lacks any legal, ethical, or relig-
ious authority," says Hussein Megalli, president of the Jordanian Bar Associ-
88. Nicolas Rothwell, Town's "Justice" Awaits Saddam, AusTRALIAN, July 22, 2004, at
7.
89. Sienho Yee, The Tu Quoque Argument as a Defense to International Crimes, Prose-
cution or Punishment, 3 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 87, 102-113, 117-123 (2004). The Interna-
tional Military Tribunal at Nuremberg did, in fact, allow consideration of tu quoque in
the mitigation of Admiral D6nitz' sentence on the charge of conducting unrestricted
submarine warfare-a practice in which the Allies had also engaged, supra. Saddam's
lawyers may also try to use this defense to avoid or blunt a charge of aggression for the
invasion of Kuwait, arguing that the American-led invasion of Iraq was a clear-cut case of
aggression.
90. Interview by Fran Kelly with Giovanni di Stefano, Saddam's attorney (ABC radio
broadcast July 1, 2004), transcript available at http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/
2004/si 144472.htm.
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ation and one of Saddam's lawyers. "Saddam is still the legitimate president
of Iraq and cannot be tried by an illegal body."
Saddam's lawyers say that since Annan implicitly recognizes Saddam as
head of the Iraqi state, the logical next step for the UN is to seek measures to
"efface the traces of American aggression."
The lawyers are not clear as to what form Annan's intervention to
secure Saddam's release should take. But they point to the precedents of
Haiti and Sierra Leone when the UN intervened to restore "illegally deposed
presidents" to power.9 1
Putting the American-led invasion on trial is certainly a clever
approach that would shore up the ancillary illegitimacy charge against the
IST. Such a politically charged position is an uphill battle, however, and it
is unlikely to establish that Saddam is the current legal president of Iraq
even though the method used to depose him was illegal.
Finally, it remains indeterminate exactly who will be on Saddam's
defense team and which attorneys will physically represent him before the
IST. Many have come forward, and there are conflicting accounts that
some, such as Jacques Verges, were retained by Saddam's nephew, while
others were retained by his wife's family. American lawyers Curtis Doeb-
bler and Ramsey Clark, as well as many prominent Arab attorneys, have
made representations that they are on Saddam's defense team. Conse-
quently, any coherent strategy depends largely upon who will proceed as
counsel.
Nevertheless, a flurry of activity has been undertaken on Saddam's
behalf. For example, British human rights lawyer Clive Stafford Smith pub-
lished a brief intended to bring Saddam's case within the domestic U.S.
court system so as to ensure his basic rights to a fair trial, competent repre-
sentation, and independent judges and juries. Arguing that the IST's crea-
tion by the United States and appointment by the interim government were
illegitimate, Stafford Smith contends, "We want to approach this in as many
ways as possible to show that the [United States] was behind the process
.... This will help prove the lack of legitimacy of the process, as well as the
bias in it."'9 2
Conclusion
For the myriad foregoing reasons, such as internal defense squabbling,
tribunal and security stabilization, prosecutorial evidence collection, and
prosecutorial strategic advantages in establishing damning facts with the
IST during the trials of Saddam's henchmen, Saddam's trial is still far away
from beginning. Indeed, Mouwafak al-Rubaie, the Iraqi National Security
Advisor, told the press recently that Saddam's trial would not begin until
91. Amir Taheri, Put Saddam on Trial - Now, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 1, 2004, at 16.
92. Robert Winnett, Saddam Bids to Challenge Case in U.S., SUNDAY TIMES (London),
Dec. 19, 2004, at 2.
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early 2006, citing the need to "get it right."93
To be sure, many have an interest in getting it right, not the least of
which include the United States and its coalition, the new Iraqi govern-
ment, and nascent Iraqi legal community. There is every indication that
the IST is determined to learn from the mistakes of the ICTY in the trial of
Milogevk as well as the experience of other tribunals that have tried other
prickly former leaders, all of whom naturally attempted to corrupt the pro-
ceedings against them.
Muzzling a defendant's political speech-making while simultaneously
offering him the chance to mount a vigorous defense is a balance that must
be struck in theory for the sake of the trial's legitimacy, but one that has
proven difficult to attain in practice. Hermann Goering, Nazi Germany's
Reichmarschall, was the first high-ranking government official to face jus-
tice for crimes amounting to genocide in 1945. Because the International
Military Tribunal allowed him wide latitude in answering Justice Robert
Jackson's cross-examination, Goering got the better of the prosecution.
Indeed, without being muzzled, he was almost able to push the Nuremberg
trial of leading Nazi figures off its tracks.
Aware of this danger, the presiding judge at the Tokyo trial of leading
Imperial Japanese figures restricted the testimony of Prime Minister Hideki
Tojo beyond his opening statement to yes-or-no answers without the possi-
bility of elaboration. Over fifty years later, however, the international tribu-
nal hearing Milogevit's case made the same mistake as the Nuremberg
tribunal with Goering. Milogevit's speech-making and political posturing
literally ruptured the normal trial schedule and allowed his case to extend
over three years.
Saddam Hussein has shown the same proclivity as other captured
leaders, trying to seize control of judicial proceedings at his first court
appearance in 2004 with several attempts to lecture the judge, coupled with
repeated attacks against the legitimacy of the court. However, the presid-
ing judge truncated this possibility, promising him more time to testify at
his actual trial instead of at the arraignment.
Former dictators and members of their elite governing group tended to
rise to power and maintain it through a deadly combination of innate per-
suasive charisma, unorthodox political insight, and raw brutality. Conse-
quently, it should come as no surprise that when these former leaders are
presented with a new platform via the witness stand, they naturally
attempt to use it to their advantage-taking control of the proceedings to
the extent that they are allowed to do so. The unfortunate result can be
that the western democratic notion of a party's "day in court" becomes
permission to disrupt the judicial process.
In the case of Milogevit, the tribunal's decision to allow him to pro-
ceed as his own lawyer during the prosecution's case, combined with direct
television coverage of the trial in Serbia, led to the creation of an image
93. Associated Press, Saddam No Closer to Trial One Year After Being Captured, THE
REcoRD (Ontario), Dec. 13, 2004, at A5.
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back in Belgrade of a man being persecuted, instead of prosecuted, by the
international system. Serbs responded to this, buying into Miloevi's
political rehabilitation of his reputation by electing him in absentia to par-
liament in the spring 2004 elections.
Such process issues are, at bottom, concerned with balance. Balance
is critical in order for the trials, and resulting convictions, to be accepted as
legitimate. However, legitimacy remains in the eye of the beholder. And
institutional calculations designed to foster a greater perception of legiti-
macy are sometimes more accurate than others, subject to the individual
circumstances of each tribunal. The legitimacy of the IST, both interna-
tionally and locally, depends to a large extent on perceptions of its fair-
ness, thoroughness, transparency, and success in completing trials on a
reasonable schedule.
While he waits, Saddam has much time for reflection. He continues
his gardening in the courtyard adjacent to his cell, where American mili-
tary forces continue to function as his jailors. The world continues to won-
der what will happen to him. Who knows how tall the little tree that he
tends will grow until he learns his fate? The Iraqi Minister for Human
Rights, Bakhtiar Amin, finds this bizarrely ironic:
This is a man who committed some of the biggest acts of ecocide in history,
when he drained the marshes in southern Iraq, used chemical weapons
against 250 Kurdish villages, and shipped whole palm tree plantations to the
charlatan leaders of the Arab world who were his shoeshine boys. And now
he's a gardener. 9
4
94. John F. Burns, For Hussein, a Spartan Life at His Former Palace, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 2004, at Al (quoting Bakhitiar Amin).
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